Gulf Influence in Washington (2015–2025)

Gulf Influence in Washington (2015–2025)

 

Introduction

Over the past decade, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have mounted expansive lobbying and public relations campaigns in Washington, D.C. to shape U.S. policy in their favor. From K Street firms to think tanks and high-level diplomatic outreach, both Gulf monarchies have spent tens of millions of dollars to cultivate influence with the White House and Congress...

Lobbying Networks and Contracts

Saudi Arabia dramatically expanded its U.S. lobbying operation after 2015, especially following events like the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen (2015) and the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi (2018)...

UAE’s K Street Lobby: The United Arab Emirates – often operating more quietly – has built one of Washington’s most formidable foreign influence networks...

High-Level Access and Diplomatic Outreach

In tandem with paid lobbyists, the UAE and Saudi Arabia wielded diplomacy and personal relationships to influence U.S. officials...

Frequent Meetings with U.S. Officials, Emirati Ambassador’s Influence, Strategic Visits and 'Charm Offensives'...

Public Relations and Influence Campaigns

Beyond direct lobbying, Saudi Arabia and the UAE ran sophisticated PR and influence campaigns to shape U.S. public opinion and the policy narrative...

Messaging to Counter Human Rights Criticism, Digital Media and AstroTurf Campaigns, 'Sportswashing' and Image Makeovers...

Funding Think Tanks and Allies in Washington

A less direct but highly impactful strategy has been financial patronage of Washington think tanks, academic programs, and advocacy groups...

Think Tanks Receiving Gulf Funding, Middle East Institute, Policy Advocacy Groups and Foundations...

Policy Outcomes and Legislative Impacts

The ultimate measure of Saudi and Emirati lobbying is whether it altered U.S. policy. Over 2015–2025, their influence efforts correlate with several notable shifts or outcomes in Washington...

Conclusion

Over 2015–2025, Saudi Arabia and the UAE executed far-reaching influence operations in Washington that have tilted U.S. policy in an authoritarian-friendly direction...

In sum, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have demonstrated how deep pockets and savvy networking can shape the agenda in the U.S. capital.

 

———— FULL REPORT —————————

Introduction

Over the past decade, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have mounted expansive lobbying and public relations campaigns in Washington, D.C. to shape U.S. policy in their favor. From K Street firms to think tanks and high-level diplomatic outreach, both Gulf monarchies have spent tens of millions of dollars to cultivate influence with the White House and Congress. A chief goal has been to blunt U.S. support for human rights and pro-democracy movements in the Middle East and North Africa, steering U.S. policy toward prioritizing security and economic interests over democratic ideals. This report examines how, between 2015 and 2025, Saudi Arabia and the UAE deployed registered lobbyists, strategic communications, financial patronage, and personal diplomacy to sway U.S. decision-makers – and the resulting impact on legislation and foreign policy. Sources include investigative journalism, Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) filings, congressional records, and reports by watchdog NGOs, ensuring a fact-based and up-to-date account.

 

Lobbying Networks and Contracts

Saudi Arabia’s K Street Lobby: Saudi Arabia dramatically expanded its U.S. lobbying operation after 2015, especially following events like the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen (2015) and the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi (2018). Since 2015, the kingdom has disclosed around $125 million in spending on U.S. influence campaigns opensecrets.org, hiring an army of lobbyists (at least 145 registered agents by one count) en.wikipedia.org. Major firms on the Saudi payroll include long-time contractors and prominent former officials:

  • Qorvis/MSL Group: A public relations firm retained since the 9/11 era, paid over $60 million in the 2000s en.wikipedia.org and still active in the 2010s. Qorvis (now part of MSLGroup) helped place pro-Saudi media content and organized events to improve Saudi’s image. In 2019, MSLGroup hired Prime Time Media to launch a Washington-based “digital news site” for Saudi Arabia, for at least $1.6 million opensecrets.org. This new media platform was intended to sway Beltway opinion in Riyadh’s favor.
  • The McKeon Group: Lobby shop of former Rep. Howard “Buck” McKeon, on a $50,000/month retainer from Saudi Arabia opensecrets.org. McKeon’s firm notably received $450,000 just three days after Khashoggi’s killing in 2018 opensecrets.org, indicating a surge of Saudi payments during the fallout. Despite public outrage, McKeon and others doubled down on lobbying for Riyadh.
  • Hogan Lovells (Norm Coleman): Former Sen. Norm Coleman (R-MN) worked as a Saudi lobbyist via Hogan Lovells. In early 2021, Hogan Lovells distributed letters – many signed by Coleman – to Congress vouching for “the Kingdom’s unwavering commitment to peace in Yemen,” just days after Saudi airstrikes killed civilians. This timing suggests a coordinated Saudi PR response to downplay human rights concerns.
  • Other Firms: Saudi contracts extended to influential outfits like Akin Gump, Brownstein Hyatt, Capitol Advisors, and others. Saudi-hired lobbyists span the political spectrum, including a number of former members of Congress and ex-administration officials, giving the kingdom insider access on Capitol Hill responsiblestatecraft.org. These lobbyists not only advocate directly but also make strategic campaign donations: in 2016–2017, U.S. lobbyists on Saudi’s payroll gave over $2.3 million in political contributions while contacting Congress on Saudi’s behalf voanews.com. Notably, 75 members of Congress who were lobbied by the Saudi team received money, and in at least a dozen cases lawmakers got donations on the very same day they were contacted about Saudi-related legislation voanews.com. Such timing raises serious concerns about quid pro quo influence.

UAE’s K Street Lobby: The United Arab Emirates – often operating more quietly – has built one of Washington’s most formidable foreign influence networks. By 2020, the UAE had 25 U.S. lobbying and PR firms registered under FARA working on its behalf quincyinst.org. In just the two years 2020–2021, Emirati clients spent over $64 million on these influence services and reported 10,765 contacts with U.S. officials or media quincyinst.org – a truly vast outreach. Key players in the UAE’s lobby include:

  • Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld: Akin Gump has been the highest-paid and most active firm for the UAE quincyinst.org. It handled lobbying on defense contracts, sanctions, and trade issues, providing detailed FARA filings. The firm and its agents also donated over $500,000 to U.S. political campaigns during this period quincyinst.org, often targeting lawmakers they lobbied for the UAE.
  • Harbor Group, Glover Park Group, and Others: The UAE Embassy and state enterprises hired firms such as the Harbour Group, BGR Government Affairs, DLA Piper, and Glover Park Group for strategic communications. Some filings were opaque (e.g. Glover Park reported simply “building relationships with Washington thought leaders” for Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund) quincyinst.org. Nonetheless, outreach was widespread. In 2020–21, lobbyists for UAE interests contacted nearly every member of Congress, concentrating on the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations committees (over 200 contacts) which oversee MENA policy quincyinst.org quincyinst.org.
  • Influence via Former U.S. Officials: Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE has enlisted ex-officials to carry its message. One high-profile case was Thomas “Tom” Barrack, a close ally of President Trump, who was indicted in 2021for secretly acting as an unregistered agent of the UAE – allegedly using his access to Trump to promote Emirati foreign policy interests responsiblestatecraft.org. (Barrack was later acquitted in 2022 on those charges, but the case exposed back-channel Emirati influence at the highest levels theguardian.com aljazeera.com.) The Barrack case revealed that the UAE orchestrated campaigns to shape U.S. policy and even election messaging, beyond what was legally declared. For instance, prosecutors detailed how Emirati officials provided Barrack with talking points to advocate for reduced U.S. pressure on Gulf allies and to paint the Muslim Brotherhood as a terror threat, aligning with UAE objectives responsiblestatecraft.org.

Summary of Contracts: Both Gulf states leveraged big budgets to hire top D.C. talent. Table 1 highlights selected lobbying contracts and expenditures in this period:

Foreign Principal

Lobbying Firm / Agent

Contract Details (Year)

Reported Activities

Saudi Arabia (gov’t)

Qorvis/MSL Group

Ongoing since 2015 (multi-year)

PR campaigns (media placement, events) opensecrets.org; organized veteran fly-ins against 9/11 bill (2016)

Saudi Arabia (gov’t)

McKeon Group (ex-Rep. Buck McKeon)

$50k/month (2016–2021) opensecrets.org

Lobbied Congress on Yemen, arms sales; received $450k post-Khashoggi opensecrets.org

Saudi Arabia (PIF)**

Hobart Hallaway & Quayle (HHQ)

Retained for LIV Golf lobbying (2022–24)

“Sportswashing” Saudi image via golf league; failed to register under FARA (alleged) dawnmena.org

UAE Embassy

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld

>$18 million (2016–2021 est.)

Hundreds of Hill contacts on arms deals (F-35), Iran sanctions, Yemenquincyinst.org quincyinst.org

UAE (ADIA SWF)

Glover Park Group

Approx. $2 mn (2015–2017)

Built ties with “thought leaders,” minimal disclosure quincyinst.org

UAE (gov’t)

Harbour Group

$45k/month (2017–2018)

Represented UAE during Qatar dispute; firm later terminated contract post-Khashoggi (2018) opensecrets.org

 

* PIF = Public Investment Fund (Saudi sovereign fund). Note: This table provides illustrative examples; actual contract values are drawn from FARA filings and media reports where available.

These contracts underline the scale: Saudi Arabia and the UAE were among the top foreign spenders on U.S. lobbying by 2018, with Saudi ranking 3rd that year at $39.3 million spent opensecrets.org. Despite brief public-relations setbacks – e.g. a few firms ostensibly dropping Saudi after Khashoggi’s murder opensecrets.org – both countries’ lobbying machines remained robust and even grew. The result is a well-funded influence infrastructure dedicated to advancing Gulf monarchies’ agendas in Washington.

High-Level Access and Diplomatic Outreach

In tandem with paid lobbyists, the UAE and Saudi Arabia wielded diplomacy and personal relationships to influence U.S. officials:

  • Frequent Meetings with U.S. Officials: Saudi and Emirati royals and envoys secured face-time with top decision-makers. In July 2021, for example, Prince Khalid bin Salman – Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Defense Minister (and brother to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman) – visited Washington for high-level talks opensecrets.org. This visit was kept low-profile by the administration opensecrets.org. Prince Khalid met with senior Pentagon officials, including Colin Kahl (Undersecretary of Defense for Policy) and even had an informal meeting with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin opensecrets.org. Such encounters, often behind closed doors, allowed Saudi leaders to press their case on sensitive issues (e.g. urging the U.S. to continue military support in Yemen) directly to the executive branch. Similarly, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) undertook a well-publicized U.S. tour in 2018, meeting President Trump, cabinet officials, and dozens of members of Congress in Washington and hosting lavish dinners. Those meetings cemented a close bond with the Trump administration, which openly aligned with Riyadh on regional issues.
  • Emirati Ambassador’s Influence: The UAE’s long-time ambassador to Washington, Yousef Al Otaiba, became legendary for his Beltway influence. Nicknamed “the most charming man in Washington,” Otaiba cultivated personal friendships across the aisle highline.huffingtonpost.com highline.huffingtonpost.com. He could be seen at power-breakfasts and Georgetown dinners with senators, journalists, and policy elites, leveraging charisma and UAE’s generous hospitality. Uniquely, Otaiba was even invited inside the Pentagon and State Department policy circles. In one case, he joined a confidential Defense Department meeting on Middle East strategy – an unusual privilege for an ambassador – where he vigorously advocated for a more aggressive U.S. military stance in Syria highline.huffingtonpost.com. Otaiba’s direct access meant the UAE’s views (such as opposition to Islamist political movements born of the Arab Spring) were heard at the highest levels. He also hosted glitzy receptions and cultural events that drew Washington VIPs, subtly selling the narrative of the UAE as a progressive, indispensable U.S. partner. This personal diplomacy complemented formal lobbying, helping frame Gulf monarchies as allies whose stability mattered more than abstract democratic values.
  • Strategic Visits and “Charm Offensives”: Both countries orchestrated visits and exchanges to win over American stakeholders. The UAE sponsored trips for think-tank fellows, journalists, and even local U.S. officials to visit Abu Dhabi and Dubai, showcasing a narrative of modernity (and downplaying human rights concerns). Saudi Arabia, for its part, opened its doors to U.S. influencers and think-tank delegations especially after 2018, aiming to repair its image. Saudi ambassadors and ministers increased their outreach on Capitol Hill when criticism grew. For instance, after some in Congress moved to limit arms sales, senior Saudi diplomats made the rounds in D.C. to argue that U.S. pressure would only “embolden Iran” and destabilize the Gulf – a talking point intended to shift debate away from human rights.
  • Informal Political Connections: The Gulf states also exploited informal channels. Under the Trump administration, personal relationships with the President’s inner circle were a back-door to influence policy. Saudi and Emirati leaders developed especially close ties with President Trump’s son-in-law and adviser, Jared Kushner (who communicated privately with MBS), and with figures like Tom Barrack. In 2017, the UAE’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) even met Trump associates in unofficial settings (including a much-scrutinized meeting in Seychelles) to discuss regional policy priorities. While not always on the public schedule, these connections proved impactful – for example, Trump’s initial endorsement of a Saudi/UAE-led blockade of Qatar in 2017 aligned strongly with arguments those leaders personally conveyed to him. Such diplomatic maneuvers, often unseen by the public, were critical in tilting U.S. responses in favor of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s preferences.

Public Relations and Influence Campaigns

Beyond direct lobbying, Saudi Arabia and the UAE ran sophisticated PR and influence campaigns to shape U.S. public opinion and the policy narrative:

  • Messaging to Counter Human Rights Criticism: A core objective was to reframe debates on human rights and democracy in the Middle East. To this end, Gulf-backed PR specialists bombarded Washington with talking points that justified crackdowns and military interventions. For example, throughout the devastating Yemen war (2015–present), Saudi lobbyists routinely circulated memos and emails to Congress and the media portraying the conflict as a humanitarian mission. Lobbyists (often former U.S. lawmakers) argued that Saudi operations were improving and that the Iran-backed Houthi rebels were solely to blame for Yemen’s suffering responsiblestatecraft.org responsiblestatecraft.org. In one January 2022 instance, a lobbyist from Off Hill Strategies distributed a letter to congressional offices insisting Saudi Arabia was “committed to achieving a lasting peace in Yemen,” while pinning all responsibility for the violence on the Houthis responsiblestatecraft.org. The very next day, Saudi warplanes bombed a detention center killing dozens of civilians responsiblestatecraft.org – underscoring the grim reality behind the PR. Nonetheless, by preemptively flooding offices with their narrative, the Saudi–UAE lobby sought to muffle criticism and keep U.S. support intact.
  • Digital Media and AstroTurf Campaigns: The Saudi government invested in creating ostensibly grassroots or independent voices to push their line. As noted, in 2019–2021 Riyadh funded a new digital news platform in D.C. to produce content favorable to Saudi perspectives opensecrets.org. Earlier, in 2016–2017, Saudi-funded consultants infamously recruited U.S. military veterans for an influence campaign on American soil. Lobbyists paid for all-expenses trips for veterans to Washington, asking them to warn Congress (often unwittingly on Saudi’s behalf) that a law allowing 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia (the JASTA bill) would endanger U.S. military interests. It later emerged that a Saudi-linked firm had booked 500 nights at President Trump’s Washington hotel to house these veterans – spending over a quarter-million dollars – as part of this scheme citizensforethics.org politifact.com. The operation was a PR ploy to astroturf opposition to a human-rights-driven bill (seeking justice for victims of terrorism) by masquerading as concerned American vets. While JASTA ultimately became law over Saudi objections, the kingdom’s willingness to engage in covert PR tactics – even enriching the President’s hotel in the process – highlighted its determination to blunt any action it perceived as hostile.
  • “Sportswashing” and Image Makeovers: In the latter half of the decade, especially, Saudi Arabia launched high-profile initiatives to launder its human rights image through entertainment and sports. The Saudi Public Investment Fund’s creation of LIV Golf (2022), for instance, was not just about sports—it hired lobbyists like Hobart Hallaway & Quayle Ventures (HHQ) to promote the venture in Washington as a sign of Saudi “reform” and openness dawnmena.org. HHQ’s filings indicate it downplayed the Saudi government’s role, prompting accusations of FARA violations for obscuring that the ultimate client was the Saudi state dawnmena.org. By pouring money into popular culture – from golf tournaments to Formula One races and tech conferences – Saudi Arabia hoped to divert attention from its repression of dissidents and war crimes dawnmena.org. In Washington, this translated into glossy events and op-eds celebrating Saudi Arabia’s “modernization” (e.g. allowing women to drive, economic Vision 2030) while muting discussion of imprisoned activists or Yemen’s civilian toll.
  • Media Outreach and Opinion Shaping: Both the UAE and Saudi influence operations targeted influential U.S. media and think-tank voices. FARA reports show Emirati agents contacted over 500 media outlets, including multiple outreach efforts to top papers like The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and Forbesquincyinst.org. The goal was to place favorable stories or op-eds – for example, highlighting UAE’s tolerance initiatives or Saudi counter-terror efforts – and to rebut investigative pieces critical of their human rights records. Saudi Arabia’s lobby, in particular, sought out D.C. commentators to push back after events like the Khashoggi murder, at times offering access to Saudi officials or funding for “research trips” in exchange for more sympathetic coverage. In think-tanks (discussed further below), Gulf-funded analysts often echoed the narrative that democratic uprisings lead to chaos or extremism, thus legitimizing the U.S. aligning with authoritarian allies. By saturating the discourse with their PR messaging, the UAE and Saudi regimes worked to shift the conversation from democratic reforms to themes of stability, counterterrorism, and business opportunities.

Funding Think Tanks and Allies in Washington

A less direct but highly impactful strategy has been financial patronage of Washington think tanks, academic programs, and advocacy groups. Contributions from the UAE and Saudi Arabia – or their state-controlled entities – have flowed into influential U.S. institutions, potentially curbing criticism of these governments’ policies:

  • Think Tanks Receiving Gulf Funding: Research by the Center for International Policy and others reveals that no other authoritarian governments give more money to U.S. think tanks than the UAE (with Saudi Arabia not far behind) responsiblestatecraft.org. For example, the UAE Embassy and Emirati donors gave at least $4 million to the Atlantic Council between 2014 and 2018, plus another $1 million in 2019–2020 responsiblestatecraft.org. In fact, the Embassy of the UAE is listed in the Atlantic Council’s top donor category (above $1 million) responsiblestatecraft.org. This support bought the UAE more than goodwill – according to an Intercept investigation, it even afforded Emirati officials the opportunity to review and comment on Atlantic Council publications prior to release responsiblestatecraft.org. The think tank, while denying any donor influence on research, nonetheless gave its Gulf benefactors behind-the-scenes input.
  • Middle East Institute (MEI): The Middle East Institute, a prominent D.C. think tank, received a staggering secret contribution of $20 million from the UAE in 2016–2017 responsiblestatecraft.org. Leaked emails exposed that this money was explicitly meant to “change conceptions about the UAE in the United States” responsiblestatecraft.org. Such a sum – funneled quietly to avoid public scrutiny – would make the UAE one of MEI’s largest donors. Indeed, MEI’s programming in recent years often emphasizes the UAE’s role as a “modernizer” in the region. Researchers have noted that MEI’s publications rarely harshly criticize Abu Dhabi’s crackdowns or its role in conflicts like Yemen – perhaps not coincidentally, given this funding. Saudi Arabia has likewise steered money to U.S. think tanks: both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi gave $600,000 to CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) in 2015 en.wikipedia.org, and Saudi-linked donors have supported the Middle East Policy Council and others en.wikipedia.org. These donations create potential conflicts of interest, as think tanks might soft-pedal criticism of their benefactors.
  • Policy Advocacy Groups and Foundations: Beyond think tanks, Gulf funds have reached universities and policy forums. The Aspen Institute has received over $5 million from the UAE since 2014 responsiblestatecraft.org and has co-hosted conferences in partnership with UAE entities. The Brookings Institution and others have also had programs underwritten by Gulf state money (Qatar had been a major donor pre-2017; UAE and Saudi picked up some slack afterwards). While not all these contributions are nefarious – some support genuine cultural exchange – they often aim to build a policy echo chamber friendly to Gulf monarchy interests. Even U.S. political institutes have seen Gulf patronage: e.g., the Clinton Foundation in the 2010s received millions from Saudi and Emirati sources (though it ceased taking foreign government money during Hillary Clinton’s 2016 campaign). The result of this largesse is that influential experts and ex-officials at well-funded institutions often articulate positions aligned with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi – whether on the need to sell arms, to confront Islamist movements, or to downplay human rights concerns. Meanwhile, those think tanks are relatively silent when the UAE or Saudi are caught in misconduct, such as the UAE’s illegal campaign contributions in U.S. elections (2016–18) or the hacking of dissidents, as one analysis pointed out responsiblestatecraft.orgresponsiblestatecraft.org. The financial ties help explain this reticence.
  • Congressional & Advocacy Influence: Gulf governments also cultivated allies in advocacy organizations. The UAE, for instance, built relationships with pro-Israel groups and hawkish foreign policy institutes in Washington, aligning on a mutual distrust of Iran and Islamists. These alliances bolstered the Gulf states’ agenda in Congress. When legislation threatening Saudi or UAE interests arose, friendly think tank scholars would often testify to Congress warning of “losing a critical partner” or cite the danger of empowering Iran – effectively echoing Saudi/UAE talking points in an academic veneer. Furthermore, Saudi and Emirati money found its way into American political advocacy indirectly – for example, via donations to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or other pro-business lobbies that would then argue against human-rights-based restrictions on arms sales. In summary, financial patronage created a network of influential voices that, knowingly or not, advanced the narrative that U.S. support for democracy or human rights in the Middle East should take a backseat to maintaining alliances with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Policy Outcomes and Legislative Impacts

The ultimate measure of Saudi and Emirati lobbying is whether it altered U.S. policy. Over 2015–2025, their influence efforts correlate with several notable shifts or outcomes in Washington:

  • Continued U.S. Military Support in Yemen: Despite the world’s worst humanitarian crisis unfolding in Yemen and bipartisan calls to end U.S. involvement, Saudi Arabia and the UAE largely succeeded in preserving American support for the Saudi-led intervention. In early 2019, Congress did pass a historic War Powers Resolution to halt U.S. backing of the Yemen war – a reflection of outrage at civilian casualties – but heavy Saudi/UAE lobbying helped secure a presidential veto from Donald Trump to nullify it vox.comdefensenews.com. Lobbyists stressed the war as essential to contain Iran and even whitewashed airstrikes by touting Saudi “humanitarian commitments”. Over seven years, Saudi Arabia spent over $100 million on U.S. lobbying and PR specifically to keep arms and support flowing to its Yemen war effort responsiblestatecraft.org. This investment paid off: the U.S. continued refueling, intelligence sharing, and arms sales for much of the conflict. Even under President Biden – who had pledged to get tough – the administration, in late 2022, quietly lobbied Congress against another Yemen War Powers resolution, arguing it was unnecessary responsiblestatecraft.org. Facing White House opposition (in line with Saudi preferences), the resolution’s sponsor pulled the vote responsiblestatecraft.org. Essentially, the Saudi/UAE lobbying machine, allied with U.S. defense contractors, managed to delay and dilute American efforts to withdraw from the war, despite widespread human rights concerns.
  • Arms Sales and Military Deals: Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi poured effort into securing advanced U.S. weaponry and preventing congressional blocks on arms transfers. When outrage grew after Khashoggi’s murder and atrocities in Yemen, Congress in 2019 and 2020 moved to disapprove certain arms sales (like precision-guided munitions) to Saudi Arabia and the UAE defensenews.com. In response, Gulf lobbying – bolstered by defense industry lobbying – swung into high gear. For example, Raytheon and other contractors joined Saudi diplomats in urging lawmakers to vote down arms embargo measures, emphasizing job losses and Iran’s threat responsiblestatecraft.org. They succeeded; while Congress passed some bans, the White House vetoed them or found ways to bypass (emergency declarations, etc.), and new deals kept coming. The UAE’s lobbying around the Abraham Accords in 2020 is a clear case: the UAE normalized relations with Israel, and lobbyists leveraged this to argue Abu Dhabi deserved rewards – namely a mega-deal for F-35 stealth fighters. Subsequent lobbying convinced the Trump administration to approve a $23 billion arms package for the UAE (including F-35s and drones) quincyinst.org. Although implementation slowed under Biden, the lobbying continued, and by late 2022 the U.S. even signaled openness to a formal security pact with the UAE quincyinst.org. Such a pact would be unprecedented and reflects how far UAE influence has advanced the idea of binding U.S. security to the monarchy. In sum, Gulf lobbying helped ensure that legislative efforts to condition or halt arms sales on human rights grounds repeatedly fell short, keeping the weapons pipeline open.
  • Blocking Accountability for Abuses: The influence campaign also aimed to shield Saudi and UAE leaders from personal accountability. A salient example is the outcome of the Khashoggi affair. In 2018, Jamal Khashoggi’s brutal murder (ordered by MBS, according to U.S. intelligence) led Congress to demand sanctions on the Crown Prince under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Act. However, Saudi lobbying and high-level pressure stymied any direct penalty on MBS. By 2021, President Biden – despite campaign promises to make MBS a “pariah” – decided not to sanction the Crown Prince, a move that drew criticism as a capitulation opensecrets.org. Observers noted this “soft gloving” aligned with Saudi warnings that punishing its de facto ruler would rupture the relationship. Similarly, when activists pushed for resolutions condemning Saudi imprisonment of women’s rights advocates or UAE’s jailing of dissidents, these measures gained little traction in Congress, often dying in committee. Lawmakers on defense and appropriations committees, courted by Gulf lobbyists, have been reluctant to let human rights concerns alter aid or arms delivery. No significant conditionality has been placed on the billions in U.S. military sales to the Gulf – a testament to the lobbying success in portraying such ties as too important to fail. As Human Rights Watch summed up, the Saudi and Emirati network has effectively convinced U.S. policymakers to “ignore or downplay” their abuses opensecrets.org, trading away consistent support for human rights in favor of realpolitik.
  • U.S. Silence on Democratic Movements: A less tangible but profound impact of Gulf influence is the muted U.S. support for democracy movements in the region during this period. When popular uprisings or reform movements emerged – be it in Bahrain, Egypt, Sudan, or elsewhere – Saudi Arabia and the UAE often opposed them and intervened (financially or militarily) to maintain the status quo. In Washington, their lobbyists reinforced this stance. For instance, both countries branded Islamist-leaning democratically elected groups (like the Muslim Brotherhood, which had political success after the Arab Spring) as extremists, urging the U.S. to follow suit. The Trump administration even considered the extraordinary step of designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization – a long-sought UAE/Saudi goal – after sustained lobbying and input from UAE-aligned voices in D.C. crsreports.congress.gov. (Ultimately, the designation did not go through, amid resistance from U.S. diplomats and legal experts.) In cases like Egypt’s 2013 coup, Saudi and UAE lobbying assured that Washington did not cut off aid to the new military regime, despite U.S. law requiring a halt after coups. They portrayed Egypt’s generals as bulwarks against terrorism, which resonated with enough U.S. officials to override concerns about the jailed opposition and cancelled elections. Overall, one can observe that through the past decade U.S. administrations grew increasingly reluctant to pressure Gulf allies (or their regional clients) on democratic reforms. The abrupt shift from President Obama’s early rhetorical support for Arab Spring protesters in 2011, to a posture of near indifference by 2017–2018, coincided with heavy Saudi/UAE lobbying to prioritize stability and counterterrorism. By 2025, the U.S. was openly prioritizing strategic partnerships with Saudi and Emirati rulers – even expanding security pledges – while democratic activists in those countries and their neighbors received scant support. This outcome aligns closely with the objectives of the Gulf lobbying campaigns.

Conclusion

Over 2015–2025, Saudi Arabia and the UAE executed far-reaching influence operations in Washington that have tilted U.S. policy in an authoritarian-friendly direction. Through lavish spending on lobbyists, calibrated personal diplomacy, message manipulation, and think-tank patronage, these monarchies secured U.S. tolerance – even tacit endorsement – of policies antithetical to human rights and democracy in the Middle East. Key U.S. foreign policy decisions, from continuing military aid in Yemen to arms sales without human-rights conditions, bear the imprint of Gulf lobbying. While national security and oil interests have always given Washington reasons to work with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the past decade’s concerted influence campaign ensured that counter-arguments – those centered on reform and rights – were systematically undermined or marginalized. Lawmakers who contemplated tough stances often faced well-timed pressure, incentivizing them to reconsider. Think tanks and PR campaigns helped normalize a narrative that equated the Gulf monarchies’ stability with regional security, implicitly dismissing pro-democracy forces as naïve or dangerous.

In sum, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have demonstrated how deep pockets and savvy networking can shape the agenda in the U.S. capital. Their lobbying might not win every battle (as occasional congressional rebukes show), but it has succeeded in blunting U.S. support for democratic movements in favor of maintaining strategic alliances. This raises difficult questions for U.S. policymakers and the public: How should America balance its interests against its values, and to what extent should foreign lobbying dollars set that balance? The experience of 2015–2025 suggests that without greater transparency and tougher safeguards against malign foreign influence, U.S. foreign policy can be swayed to overlook human rights – with profound consequences for the people of the Middle East.


DOWNLOAD REPORT

Sources: U.S. Department of Justice FARA filings; OpenSecrets and Center for International Policy analyses opensecrets.org voanews.com; investigative reporting by The Washington Post, Huffington Post, and others opensecrets.org highline.huffingtonpost.com; reports by Human Rights Watch and Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN) dawnmena.org; and congressional records on arms sales and resolutions defensenews.com, among other cited references throughout this report. All evidence points to a well-funded, strategic bid by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to win Washington’s favor – largely at the expense of the very values of human rights and democracy that the U.S. professes to support.

News

Share