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Democratic Backsliding in Tunisia:
Lessons for Democracy
in the Muslim World
Abstract
Tunisia was widely hailed as the lone success story of the Arab Spring, emerging with a democratic constitution and peaceful transfers of power. Yet, by 2021, this democratic momentum reversed dramatically under President Kais Saied. This paper examines the processes, conditions, and consequences of Tunisia’s democratic backsliding. Drawing on comparative constitutional analysis, process tracing, and civil society research, it situates Tunisia within broader theoretical debates about democratization in Muslim-majority countries. The case of Tunisia reveals that institutional design alone cannot inoculate a state against authoritarian relapse without economic inclusion, robust civil society protections, and a democratic political culture. This study challenges culturalist narratives and emphasizes structural and institutional variables as central to democratic durability.
1. Introduction
Tunisia emerged from the 2011 Arab Spring with remarkable democratic promise. In a region fraught with authoritarianism and sectarian conflict, Tunisia stood as a beacon: adopting a progressive constitution in 2014, holding free elections, and empowering civil society. But on July 25, 2021, President Kais Saied invoked Article 80 of the 2014 Constitution to dissolve parliament and concentrate executive power. While initially justified as a response to political gridlock and corruption, the subsequent months marked a clear departure from democratic norms.
This paper investigates Tunisia’s democratic backsliding and considers what lessons this trajectory holds for democracy in Muslim-majority societies. It argues that Tunisia’s reversal is best understood through a combination of institutional weaknesses, economic malaise, and populist authoritarianism. The implications extend beyond Tunisia, offering critical insights into the fragility of democracy in transitional and post-authoritarian settings.
2. Literature Review: Rethinking Democracy in Muslim-Majority Contexts
The concept of democratic backsliding has gained scholarly traction in the last decade, particularly in the work of Nancy Bermeo (2016), who defines it as the “state-led debilitation or elimination of political institutions that sustain an existing democracy.” This erosion does not necessarily take the form of a coup or military takeover but may unfold through legal mechanisms and populist legitimation.
In classic democratization theory, Linz and Stepan (1996) emphasize five arenas of consolidation: civil society, political society, rule of law, a usable state bureaucracy, and an institutionalized economic society. Tunisia appeared to make progress in all five. Yet, the backslide underscores the limits of institutional formalism when enforcement is weak and when political actors manipulate rules to their advantage.
Some analyses have attributed authoritarian persistence in the Muslim world to cultural or religious factors (e.g., Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis). However, scholars like Alfred Stepan argue that Islam is not inherently undemocratic and that institutional and socio-economic structures are far more explanatory. Tunisia’s trajectory supports this institutionalist view. The problem was not Islam, but the fragility of democratic norms, lack of economic inclusion, and the personalization of power.
More recent studies (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Waldner & Lust, 2018) argue that democracies today often die slowly—from within—through elected leaders who dismantle democratic institutions under the guise of reform. President Saied fits this mold, portraying himself as a savior from corruption while consolidating power through plebiscitary mechanisms.
3. Methodology
This paper uses a qualitative, mixed-methods design:
- Comparative Constitutional Analysis of the 2014 and 2022 constitutions to assess the dismantling of democratic safeguards.
- Process Tracing of political developments from July 2021 through 2023 to map causal mechanisms of backsliding.
- Civil Society Analysis, drawing on protest documentation, reports by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and International IDEA, and media sources including Al Jazeera, Le Monde, and interviews with Tunisian activists and scholars.
4. Findings
4.1 The Limits of Institutionalism
The 2014 Tunisian Constitution was lauded internationally. It guaranteed a separation of powers, judicial independence, and individual rights. Yet institutions on paper did not translate into democratic resilience. Parties were fragmented, electoral coalitions were unstable, and the judiciary remained politicized.
The 2022 Constitution, adopted by referendum amid low turnout (approx. 30%), dramatically restructured the balance of power. It granted President Saied near-absolute authority, including the ability to appoint judges and bypass parliament. While technically legal, these changes undermined the spirit of democratic pluralism.
This suggests that institutional design without enforcement and culture of democratic practice is insufficient. As Thomas Carothers warns, constitutions are not self-enforcing. Tunisia demonstrates how the “hardware” of democracy can be overridden when the “software”—political culture and civil commitment—is absent.
4.2 Populism and the Authoritarian Drift
President Saied’s rhetoric painted him as an outsider to the corrupt political elite. Using a populist discourse of moral renewal and national rescue, he appealed directly to “the people,” often bypassing intermediary institutions. His background as a law professor and outsider lent credibility to his promises of technocratic reform.
This mirrors a broader pattern where populist leaders weaponize popular dissatisfaction to entrench power (Mounk, 2018). In Tunisia, frustration with unemployment (18% nationally, and over 40% among youth), inflation, and elite impunity created fertile ground. Saied’s rule-by-decree governance post-2021 and arrest of opponents under anti-terror laws exemplify how populism morphs into autocracy.
Yet unlike classical dictatorships, this shift was gradual and clothed in constitutional legitimacy—a hallmark of 21st-century authoritarianism.
4.3 Civil Society: Resilience Meets Repression
Civil society was a pillar of Tunisia’s post-2011 transition. The Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), the National Union of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT), and organizations like the Tunisian League for Human Rights played a crucial role in mediating political conflict and defending liberties.
However, under Saied, these groups have faced growing pressure. Surveillance, judicial harassment, and regulatory crackdowns have curtailed civil society space. The arrest of activists, dissolution of opposition parties, and restrictions on foreign-funded NGOs signal a chilling environment.
Despite scattered protests and statements of condemnation, civil society has struggled without institutional allies or international backing. The disbanding of the Supreme Judicial Council in 2022—once a key check on executive authority—exemplifies this isolation.
5. Discussion: Broader Lessons for the Muslim World
5.1 Elections Alone Are Not Enough
Tunisia’s story reminds us that elections, though vital, are not sufficient for democratic consolidation. Electoral legitimacy can coexist with authoritarian governance, particularly when rule of law is weak. As Fareed Zakaria notes, “illiberal democracy” is on the rise—where leaders are elected but institutions are hollowed.
5.2 Populism as a Trojan Horse
Populist leaders often exploit institutional dysfunction to justify radical centralization. Their legitimacy rests on a direct, unmediated relationship with the people, bypassing checks and balances. Tunisia shows how quickly populism can become a tool of “legal authoritarianism” (Scheppele, 2018).
5.3 Civil Society Needs Legal and Political Guarantees
Civil society actors cannot safeguard democracy on their own. They require institutional protection—laws that ensure freedom of association, an independent judiciary to defend those rights, and a media landscape that fosters pluralism. In Tunisia, the erosion of these protections has made resistance symbolic rather than transformative.
5.4 The Culturalist Fallacy
Tunisia rebukes essentialist claims that Islam is incompatible with democracy. Its 2014 constitution was one of the most progressive in the MENA region, and Islamist party Ennahda accepted secular norms and electoral defeat. The breakdown was structural—not religious. Poverty, institutional weakness, and elite dysfunction—not Islam—undermined democracy.
6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Tunisia’s democratic unraveling underscores the fragility of post-authoritarian transitions, especially under conditions of economic hardship and institutional fragility. Its trajectory warns against over-reliance on electoralism and formalism in democracy promotion.
Recommendations:
- Strengthen Enforcement Mechanisms
International donors and domestic actors must invest in oversight institutions—judicial councils, anti-corruption bodies, independent electoral commissions—that can resist executive domination. - Link Economic Equity with Democratic Reform
Addressing youth unemployment, regional disparities, and corruption is crucial. A democracy that fails to deliver materially risks losing legitimacy. - Protect and Empower Civil Society
International organizations should fund legal defense funds, training for journalists and NGOs, and rapid response units for human rights violations. Domestic legal reform should embed civil society protections in constitutional and statutory law. - Reframe the Democracy Debate in Muslim Contexts
Moving beyond culturalist arguments, democracy promotion should focus on institutional resilience, legal safeguards, and economic inclusion, rather than assumptions about religious compatibility.
Bibliography
- Bermeo, Nancy. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 27, no. 1, 2016, pp. 5–19.
- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. Crown, 2018.
- Carothers, Thomas. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 1, 2002, pp. 5–21.
- Mounk, Yascha. The People vs. Democracy. Harvard University Press, 2018.
- Scheppele, Kim Lane. “Autocratic Legalism.” University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 85, 2018, pp. 545–583.
- International IDEA. “The Global State of Democracy 2022.”
- Human Rights Watch. “Tunisia: Attacks on Judiciary, Freedoms.” Reports from 2021–2023.
- Al Jazeera, Le Monde, SNJT, UGTT, and others (2021–2023 reports).
